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## Animal Repression

### Speciesism as Pathology

By Zipporah Weisberg

*Be. And, at the same time, know what it is not to be.  
That emptiness inside you allows you to vibrate  
in resonance with your world. Use it for once.  
To all that has run its course, and to the vast unsayable  
numbers of beings abounding in Nature  
add yourself gladly, and cancel the cost.*

—Rainer Maria Rilke<sup>1</sup>

Peter Singer defines speciesism as “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.”<sup>2</sup> This is certainly the fundamental *structure* of speciesism: the human species positions itself as superior to other species, and gives itself license to inflict egregious cruelties against them, simply by virtue of the fact that they are *not human*. Furthermore, it is well known that the justification for speciesism and the exclusion of other animals from ethical consideration remains the assertion of an insurmountable binary opposition between putatively rational humans and irrational animals. This dichotomy, which can be traced back to classical antiquity, began to have especial import in the early modern period with the arrival of Renaissance humanism; it has for the most part been consistently and uncritically reaffirmed in Western religious, philosophical, and scientific thought ever since. The rational human/irrational animal distinction has undoubtedly provided the justification for the instrumentalization and systemic torture and murder of other animals over the centuries. However, what is not wholly accounted for in the analysis of this

binary opposition, or in the debates around the origins of speciesism as a whole, is the psychological dimension of animal hatred. Part and parcel of the system of apartheid which pits humans against other animals is humans' repression of their own animality. By "animality" I mean principally the *embodied consciousness* we have in common with other sentient beings and the intersubjective relationality this shared embodiment engenders.<sup>3</sup> Our fanatic denial of our own animality and our concomitant systemic brutalization of other animals throughout the millennia have had profoundly detrimental effects not only on our animal kin but also on our own psychic health. In short, a massive self-deception has been at play in the course of the development of Western civilization, which has proved not only immensely damaging to the welfare of other animals, but has also proven injurious to humans' psychological well being. Animal repression can result in or is even constitutive of an unconscious sense of loss, melancholia, ambivalence, guilt, and a host of other neuroses, on both an individual and a societal level. To properly understand and ultimately overcome speciesism, then, it is paramount that we examine the psychological mechanism of repression which results in undue torment for both the oppressed and the oppressors.

### THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL'S THEORY OF REPRESSION

The early members of the Frankfurt School, especially Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse, offer a starting point for our investigation of animal repression and oppression as they are arguably the first political theorists to acknowledge that this twin process of negation has resulted not just in misery for other beings, but in serious psychic and even cognitive injury to human beings. They extend Freud's theory of repression to suggest that civilization is built not only on the repression of drives but also on repression of "inner nature"—or human sensuousness—and "outer nature"—or the natural world and all its infinitely varied sentient and insentient constituents.

Adorno and Horkheimer in particular located the originary negation or repression of inner and outer nature in the shift from animism to mytho-enlightenment (i.e., Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian thought). On their usage, enlightenment, or *instrumental reason* (the reduction of the world of experience to categories of manipulation, control, and domination), is coterminous with the disenchantment of nature, that is, with the repudiation of the animist belief that not just humans but *all* beings—mineral, vegetable, and animal—are animated by souls, and are therefore driven by intent and will.<sup>4</sup> With the new Enlightenment ethos of mastery over nature, "matter was to be fully controlled without the illusion of immanent powers or hidden properties."<sup>5</sup>

Once co-subjects, more-than-human beings had by the onset of the scientific revolution become the *objects* of scientific investigation, instruments of calculation, and eventually, raw material for capitalist exploitation.<sup>6</sup> This process did not, as the myth of progress would have us believe, improve humans' lot, but worsened it. In particular, they argue that enlightenment's artificial binary between the *disembodied mind* and the *sensuous body* results in shameful violence against other beings and prevents us from developing our own being to its fullest potentiality—a capacity which can only be properly grounded in sensuousness.<sup>7</sup> In their words:

The standardization of the intellectual function through which the mastery of the senses is accomplished, the acquiescence of thought to the production of unanimity, implies an impoverishment of thought no less than that of experience; the separation of the two realms [sensual and rational] leaves both damaged.<sup>8</sup>

To sever thinking from sensuousness, in other words, is both to degrade our experience as natural beings and to diminish our capacity for critical thinking.

While Adorno and Horkheimer generally include both sentient and non-sentient beings under the heading "nature," they occasionally highlight the oppression of animals and its particular role in the psychic mutilation of the human subject. For example, they point to vivisectionists as the epitome of the distorted human being produced by enlightenment and its repressive mechanism. By ravaging the bodies of helpless animals in the name of putative rationality, animal experimenters play out a brutal *irrational* logic that reduces all beings—human and more-than-human alike—to mere objects of calculation. "By mistreating animals," they write, "they announce that they, and only they in the whole of creation, function voluntarily in the same mechanical, blind, automatic way as the twitching movements of the bound victims made use of by the expert."<sup>9</sup> Though we have conquered internal and external nature in general and other animals in particular, our "success" has only come at the expense of our own further alienation and neurosis. Ironically, in proclaiming its mastery over other beings, it was the human being who proved itself irrational and bereft. As Herbert Marcuse observes, the human subject in advanced industrial civilization has become a distorted version of what it *could* and *ought* to be.<sup>10</sup> Propping itself up as the great rational being on the corpses of other beings to whom it has denied subjectivity and rationality, the human subject transforms *itself* into a kind of object—an unthinking automaton, a one-dimensional shell.<sup>11</sup>

Our quest for mastery over inner and outer nature in general and animality and other animals in particular has also fostered brutality. Though enlightenment was supposed to free us from "barbarism" it has in fact exacerbated our proclivity for violence against both other beings and each other.<sup>12</sup> As Adorno

and Horkheimer write, "[h]uman beings are so radically estranged from themselves and from nature that they know only how to use and harm each other."<sup>13</sup> According to Marcuse, the invention of the scientific method and the instrumentalization of reason and of nature which took hold during the scientific revolution, in particular, not only enabled the domination of nature but in fact laid the groundwork for the domination of humans:

The scientific method which led to the ever-more-effective domination of nature thus came to provide the pure concepts as well as the instrumentalities for the ever-more-effective domination of man by man *through* the domination of nature.<sup>14</sup>

By reducing other beings to objects of control, we reduce ourselves to the same thing.

Marcuse adds another important dimension to our discussion by pointing out how advanced industrial society has cultivated Thanatos, or aggression and the death drive for the purpose of dominating of nature in general and animals in particular, at the expense of Eros—the drive for unrestrained sexual gratification, the creative life force, and the source of our potential emotional bond with other beings. Noting the distinction, already implicit in Freud's work, between "necessary" and "unnecessary" repression, Marcuse distinguishes between "basic" and "surplus" repression. The former is, in his view, necessary for humans to live together and is not oppressive, while the latter is constitutive of domination. Of surplus repression, Marcuse tells us: "[w]ithin the total structure of the repressed personality, surplus-repression is that which is the result of specific societal conditions sustained in the specific interests of domination."<sup>15</sup> Whereas Freud normalizes the subordination of non-genital, non-procreative sexual activity and gratification of the procreative function in the course of a human individual's sexual maturation, Marcuse insists that this process is one of the principal forms of surplus repression in patriarchal techno-capitalist society because it reduces infinitely varied free erotic expression to instrumentality. Under the reign of "genital supremacy" the body is a servant to a state-capitalist machine that demands a constant influx of efficient workers. Marcuse also brings to light the direct correlation between the repression of Eros and the body's natural erotic impulses, on one hand, and the domination of nature in general and other animals in particular, on the other. He writes,

the entire progress of civilization is rendered possible only by the transformation and utilization of the death instinct or its derivatives. . . . [A]ggressive impulses provide energy for the continuous alteration, mastery, and exploitation of nature to the advantage of mankind. In attacking, splitting, changing, pulverizing things and animals (and, periodically, also men), man extends his dominion over the world and advances to ever richer stages of civilization.<sup>16</sup>

In other words, to shackle the erotic expression of human beings is to condemn other beings to chains. By the same token, to enslave other animals is to tighten humans' bonds to the apparatus of "technological rationality," which reduces every thing, every being, every action, and every breath to a *calculation*. As a result of surplus repression in patriarchal and techno-capitalist society, the human being's capacity for love is deformed into an irrational explosion of hatred and violence against both other humans and other animals.

The early Frankfurt School theorists help to illuminate the relationship between the systematic persecution of other animals and the distortion of the human subject. However, they do not develop their critique of animal repression and oppression at length, nor do they explore the particular neuroses which have developed as a result. Because we are not merely natural beings, but *animals*, the repression of animality and the oppression of animals respectively has, in my view, been especially traumatic to our individual and collective psyches. On closer examination, we can identify a number of symptoms in the modern human being that are constitutive of speciesism and its basis in repression.

### MELANCHOLIA, AMBIVALENCE, AND GUILT

While on a conscious level we persist in deluding ourselves that we have expunged our animal natures once and for all, our repressed animality remains with us. Despite the apparent immensity of the repressive mechanism, repression by its very nature is not absolute. As Freud explains, "its essence consists simply in the act of turning—and keeping—something away from the conscious."<sup>17</sup> The powerful psychic apparatus oriented toward maximizing pleasure can never be wholly dismantled, only damaged and hidden away in the dusty corners of the unconscious. As Christopher White observes, Freud recognized that there are not only traces of drives but also of "animal life" lingering in the human body and psyche." White continues, "the modern human subject finds himself inhabited by his most other Other."<sup>18</sup> The repressed animal vehemently rebels against its internment, thrashes about in our unconscious, and claws at our flesh pleading for release. Though we seldom acknowledge our inner horror at the violence we inflict upon other animals, that violence nonetheless remains with and within us, manifesting as *melancholia*. Unlike mourning, where the object of loss is known to the subject, and who thence can work the emotion through, melancholia is the result of an unknown or unconscious loss, chiefly the alienation from (or loss of) one's own ego, coupled with an attachment to the lost object.<sup>19</sup>

A further manifestation of the damage done by the repression-oppression complex can be observed in the neurotic ambivalence we exhibit toward other

animals. In Freud's theory, ambivalence is "the reversal of a drive's content into its opposite," as, for example, in "*the transformation of love into hate*."<sup>20</sup> Ambivalence, he argues, most clearly manifests itself in the Oedipal complex and in the drama of the prehistorical "band of brothers" who kill their father to rob him of his exclusive sexual rights to their mother.<sup>21</sup> Governed as much by Eros and their love of the father as by Thanatos (or the aggression which enabled them to commit patricide), and trapped forever in the torturous web of ambivalence, the band of brothers feel tremendous guilt at their violent betrayal. In an attempt to appease their conscience and compensate for their crime, they resurrect the dead father in a surrogate—first in the form of the totemic animal and then, with the arrival of Christianity, God the Father.<sup>22</sup> Driven by an admixture of blood love and blood lust, the band of brothers—here a metaphor for the human species as a whole—achieves its sense of authority and autonomy, but without fully shaking off its sense of guilt or overcoming its ambivalence.<sup>23</sup>

Human beings are caught in a similar tug-of-war between loving and hateful impulses toward other animals. Under the rule of repressive civilization and its insistence on defining the human as *not* animal, the fundamental empathy and friendship we might otherwise have felt vis-à-vis other animals—whose needs, wants, fears, and joys are so similar to our own—have, under the process of repression, turned into antipathy and contempt. While it would be an exaggeration to say that all human beings are naturally inclined to feel affection for all other animals, it can certainly be said that many people do exhibit natural and spontaneous affection toward many other species of animals. In fact, while humans may have naturally aggressive impulses toward each other and other beings, aggression and sadism have been expressly cultivated to serve the interests of technocapitalist progress in repressive patriarchal society, while the non-dominating, loving feelings we might also inherently feel with other beings have been deliberately quashed or downplayed.

When we become conscious of our sadistic behavior toward other animals who we might otherwise feel an affinity for, profound guilt sets in. This guilt adds another dimension to our ambivalence. We kill and maim helpless animals, but we feel bad about it, at least on an unconscious level. Indeed, our repressed animality lives on in this guilt, reverberating through the depths of our psyche. Guilt is then incorporated into the structure of love itself. As Melanie Klein observed through her psychoanalysis of children, "[t]hese feelings of guilt and distress now enter as a new element into the emotion of love."<sup>24</sup> However, our ambivalent feelings toward other animals are more complicated. We may entertain violent impulses toward humans, but, for the most part, stop short of carrying them out (Klein gives the example of the infant's rage against the mother). However, we go a step further with other animals

and, as a society, bring our bloody fantasies to fruition by committing atrocities against them on a massive scale.

Many people, tormented by feelings of ambivalence and overcome with guilt at the violence repressive civilization compels them to participate or to be complicit in, simply become numb. But this too is a symptom of the pathology of speciesism. Freud explains that "hysterical indifference" toward or lack of affect for a previously loved object are products of repression and/or of the breakdown of the repressive mechanism. In the case of the latter, "the emotive charge can be made to disappear entirely," so that a person displays total *indifference* to a previously loved object.<sup>25</sup> Our tendency to become "immune" to extreme violence against other animals in laboratories, factory farms, and so on is an example of the unnatural indifference that arises from repression of a former love-object. Slaughterhouse workers, for example, who slit the throats and dismember the bodies of scores of terrified animals day after day, must engage in a Herculean—or rather, *Odyssean*—feat of self-repression, suppressing what might otherwise be their natural affection toward, or sense of affinity with, their victims.<sup>26</sup> As Carol Adams observes, people who "work in the disassembly line of slaughterhouses . . . must accept on a grand scale a double annihilation of self . . . must be alienated from their own bodies and animals' bodies as well."<sup>27</sup> Rather than regard the living animal before them as an embodied subject, they are compelled to freeze their hearts, their humanity, and regard the animal as an "absent referent," that is, as a mere *symbol* for (dead) meat, without value in itself. The self-alienation in the slaughterhouse is also the result of the fragmentation of the labor process so vividly outlined by Marx, in which the once (or potentially) *whole* human being has been severed into a series of parts, limbs, like so many components of a machine, becoming a kind of "crippled monstrosity," both in body and spirit.<sup>28</sup>

Here, however, it is necessary to introduce a feminist perspective to this broad Freudian view of repression, alienation, and violence. Enlightenment reason is not gender-neutral but distinctly patriarchal in character—a fact highlighted in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* by Adorno and Horkheimer, who note the overlapping oppressions of women and other animals brought about by the transition to the Enlightenment and scientific worldviews. As Carolyn Merchant writes, in consolidating a worldview that depicted nature as feminine, dead, and passive, the scientific revolution "sanctioned the domination of both nature and women."<sup>29</sup> Women, reduced to immanence, were relegated to a position alongside other animals "below" ostensibly transcendent men. Eventually, as Adorno and Horkheimer note, "modern puritanical woman" came to represent "nature not in its wildness but in its 'domestication.'"<sup>30</sup> Woman was the visible embodiment of the tamed inner and outer "beast." Josephine Donovan is therefore right to insist that "the domination of nature

[is] rooted in postmedieval, Western, *male* psychology," a male psychology, of course, that is not innate, but culturally and historically determined by the demands of patriarchy, enlightenment, and techno-capitalism.<sup>31</sup> We therefore need not accept Freud's essentialist view that "the desire to subjugate" is inherent in male sexuality or psychology.<sup>32</sup> In patriarchal societies, aggression is glorified while care, nurturing, empathy, and compassion for the vulnerable are vilified as symptoms of (feminine) "sentimentality" and weakness.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, women must "act like men"—that is, clamp down on their natural human capacity for empathy—when the society finds it productive for them to do so. Thus, women put to work in animal processing facilities or laboratories are expected to adopt a "masculine" disposition at the expense of any nurturing impulses they might initially harbor toward other beings. Ambivalence and guilt are the fine print of their job description.

### ANIMAL UNCANNY

Our perpetual struggle at once to impede and facilitate the return of our repressed animality is evinced in our frequent experience of other animals as uncanny. Though the experience of the uncanny is not a neurosis per se, it taps into unconscious and repressed fears and desires. The very term *uncanny* (*Unheimlich*), Freud relates, contains a dual and ambiguous meaning. On the one hand, *Unheimlich* means literally "un-homely," or more generally, that which is "unfamiliar." Our experience of the uncanny arouses horror, fear, or dread.<sup>34</sup> Yet in order for something to be *Unheimlich* it must first have been *Heimlich*. *Heimlich* means "belonging to the house, not strange, familiar . . . dear and intimate, homely."<sup>35</sup> We identify the familiar with that which is contained or concealed in an intimate, private space, like the home, and the unfamiliar with that which is exposed and revealed.<sup>36</sup> Hence German philosopher Friedrich Schelling's remark (quoted by Freud) that the uncanny is "everything that was meant to remain secret and hidden and has come into the open."<sup>37</sup> This exposing of what was hitherto concealed becomes a source of terror, even though, paradoxically, it is that which is most intimately known to us.

Freud's notion of the uncanny captures the ambivalent psychic struggle that results from the joint repression of our own animality and our oppression of other animals—our combined fascination and horror, our longing for connection with other animals, on the one hand, and our dread of the animal other, on the other. The animal is that which is both familiar and feared, hidden and revealed. According to White, other animals evoke the uncanny through their voices because, though they speak without words, we can nonetheless understand what they are saying. White describes a scene in William Faulkner's *As*

*I Lay Dying* to illustrate this point: "[c]oming from out of the wild and voiceless darkness, the sounds of the honking geese, in their uncanny proximity to speech, mock the ineffectuality of language."<sup>38</sup> Language itself, White suggests, is permeated with and grounded in the "other-than-human."<sup>39</sup> But it is not only animals' voices that arouse in us a feeling of the uncanny—their bodies, especially when pacified for human amusement, can also arouse a sense of *das Unheimlich*. "Exotic" animals on display at zoos, for example, are both familiar and foreign, and that is part of their attraction, while the circus is a kind of orgy of the uncanny. The crowds are not only amused but also dazzled and terrified by the contorted animals they see before them. In coercing other animals into performing human actions, in pressing the more-than-human into a human mold, we force closed the gap between the strange and the familiar. But only artificially. For what is *truly* familiar about these animals is their need for independence, social interaction with their family members and peers, self-determination, and care—the same needs that shape and give meaning to our own lives. The uncanny is for this very reason also at play when other animals resist their subjugation. In 1994 a female elephant named Tyke killed her trainer, Allen Campbell, in front of a crowd of spectators at Circus International. She then made a run for it down the streets of Honolulu, trying desperately to find *home*, before she was gunned down by the local police. Tyke was "meant" to be kept hidden in some dark stall and exposed under the glare of circus lights, but burst out into the open air and outside the confines of human domination—if only momentarily. And so she had to be murdered. As Adorno and Horkheimer remind us, "[e]nlightenment is mythical fear radicalized. . . . Nothing is allowed to remain outside since the mere idea of the 'outside' is the real source of fear."<sup>40</sup>

When we capture fleeting glimpses of animals in the "wilderness" in photographs in *National Geographic* and other media, we can also be overcome by a sense of the uncanny. There is something vaguely familiar in the faces of these more-than-human creatures, whether mammals, amphibians, or insects, which reverberates in the recesses of our unconscious. But we are also struck by their "outsideness," by the total unfamiliarity of the particular space-time continuum(s) they inhabit, of their alien "styles of being."<sup>41</sup> We are reminded that the "open" is in a sense the *outside*. It is a place of being that is *open to all beings* and not, as Martin Heidegger claimed, the exclusive province of humans.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, it is humans who, in our routinized, operationalized, mechanized lives have *closed ourselves off* from the open. "With their whole gaze / animals behold the Open. Only our eyes / are as though reversed / and set like traps around us, keeping us inside" (Rilke).<sup>43</sup> Our efforts to achieve transcendence through reason lead us to a self-imposed homelessness. The "emergence" of "self-awareness, reason and imagination," according to Erich Fromm, has "made man into an anomaly, into

the freak of the universe. . . . He is set apart while being a part; he is homeless, yet chained to the home he shares with all other creatures.<sup>44</sup> We have exiled ourselves from our proper home amongst our fellow beings-in-the-world, alienated ourselves from an embodied form of being we continually try, in vain, to transcend. In beholding these creatures, we catch a glimpse of where and what we unconsciously long to be.

According to Freud, any depiction of a double, or *doppelgänger*, also arouses a feeling of the uncanny. In depictions of the *doppelgänger* in literature, he explains,

a person may identify himself with another and so become unsure of his true self; or he may substitute the other's self for his own. The self may thus be duplicated, divided and interchanged. . . . The double was originally an insurance against the extinction of the self . . . [but] the meaning of the "double" changes: having once been an assurance of immortality, it becomes the uncanny harbinger of death.<sup>45</sup>

To look into another animal's eyes is uncanny because encountering our *doppelgänger* destabilizes our artificial sense of self as not-animal. The subjugated animal-other is the uncanny harbinger of death inasmuch as its ravaged body reminds us of the (attempted) extinction of our animality. Theodore Roethke's poem, "The Bat," captures this jarring impact of the *doppelgänger*: "But when he brushes up against a screen / We are afraid of what our eyes have seen / For something is amiss or out of place / When mice with wings can wear a human face."<sup>46</sup> In a similar vein, the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty underscored the way in which other animals' faces are like mirrors of our own—to behold them both reveals and conceals our own animality:

this relationship [between embodied beings] is an ambiguous one, between beings who are both embodied and limited and an enigmatic world of which we catch a glimpse (indeed which we haunt incessantly) but only ever from points of view that hide as much as they reveal, a world in which every object displays the human face it acquires in a human gaze.<sup>47</sup>

The animal face—and the "face" of the other which, in Emmanuel Levinas' terms, solicits our ethical responsibility not to kill it and to protect it from harm—haunts us like the memory of our own (repressed) animality.<sup>48</sup> In the eyes of other animals we see the challenge to their oppression, their implicit rebuke of human arrogance, and the irreversibility of what makes us and other beings *animal*: our embodied consciousness and our relationality with other sentient beings. Thus, while our animal doubles may be, in one sense, the harbingers of death, in their eyes we may also glimpse *the promise of a new life*.

## MIMESIS, MANIACAL LAUGHTER, AND ANIMAL FANTASIES

Not only does repression not eradicate its object, but (Freud notes) "there is an unmistakable tendency to restore the repressed idea in its entirety."<sup>49</sup> One way in which we attempt to revive the lost other is through identification and imitation.<sup>50</sup> A process of reversal occurs whereby the internal and external animal, cast out from human experience, is *re-internalized*, but now in exaggerated, distorted, or stereotyped form. Horkheimer's theory of mimesis illustrates this process well. In his view, repressed nature or animality returns in the form of a *revolt* against the subject that has repressed it. This revolt occurs when the human subject mimics the very nature she aims to transcend. Horkheimer paints a vivid picture of this mimetic tendency at play in Nazi Germany:

Anyone who ever attended a National-Socialist meeting in Germany knows that speakers and audience got their chief thrill in acting out socially repressed mimetic drives. . . . The high spot of such a meeting was the moment when the speaker impersonated a Jew. He imitated those he would see destroyed. His impersonation aroused raucous hilarity, because a forbidden natural urge was permitted to assert itself without fear of reprimand.<sup>51</sup>

Similarly, as nature revolts within us we engage in acts of brutality normally ascribed to other "vicious" animals who, in reality, would cause us no harm if we simply left them alone. We hear news stories all the time of workers in sites of mechanized violence like slaughterhouses and laboratories having engaged in deliberate acts of extreme violence against animals, such as kicking already sick and injured chickens around like footballs, or beating puppies to death, laughing all the while. Through this behavior they imitate the vilified "beast" who, they imagine, ravages her victims without recourse to moral restraint. It is they, however, who, as a result of repression, lack moral restraint.

But such brutal sadism is exhibited too in the "raucous hilarity" which swells through us whenever other animals are depicted as objects of ridicule or made to suffer the brunt of our jokes. In Freud's view, jokes can be healthy outlets for repressed unconscious desires or acts of rebellion against the unnatural strictures of "ruthless morality."<sup>52</sup> As products of repression they may also indicate a repressed desire that needed to be released, exposed, and thereby relieved.<sup>53</sup> In this regard, the frequent use of animal imagery or analogies in jokes, idioms, and figures of speech may reveal society's underlying need to give voice to the repressed animality dwelling in our own unconscious, as well as to our discomfort with the knowledge of our collusion in violence against other animals. In this connection, Adorno and Horkheimer distinguish between "wrong," "diabolical," "ringing," and sadistic laughter, on the one hand, and celebratory or "reconciled" laughter, on the other.

Reconciled laughter “resounds with the echo of escape from power.”<sup>54</sup> It is the laughter of freedom and of resistance against domination. Wrong laughter, on the other hand, resounds with the subject’s enslavement to coercive power. It spews from the mouth of the oppressor and is directed at her victims—namely, the weak, who are the objects of ridicule most ready to hand. Such laughter is “wrong” because it humiliates rather than liberates those who are oppressed. It is diabolical because “there is laughter when there is nothing to laugh about,” and because it laughs in the face of ethical responsibility to the other.<sup>55</sup> Thus, rather than foster reconciliation, wrong laughter parodies it.<sup>56</sup>

The endless jokes we make about other animals parody what is in truth the urgent need for reconciliation with our animality and our animal kin. Examples of such non-reconciliatory, wrong laughter at the expense of other animals abound in contemporary culture. Circus trainers beat and torture elephants, bears, lions, and so on into “performing” for us so that we can laugh at how ridiculous they look doing things that are not natural to them, such as riding bicycles, balancing on balls, and other idiotic stunts. In a similar vein, in 2009 the host of “As It Happens,” a popular Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio program, relayed the story of a pig who had managed to escape from a transport vehicle on the way to slaughter, only to be hit by a car on the highway and killed. But rather than take this incident as an opportunity to question the ethics of animal transport and factory farming (a potentially reconciliatory gesture) the host demeaned the pig further by making a pun about “pork on the grill.” Similarly, on National Public Radio in the United States, a programmer jokingly asked the scientists who had killed a 405-year-old clam—the longest-lived animal ever recorded—for research (on human-induced climate change no less) whether or not they had cooked and eaten it. Here is laughter where there is nothing to laugh about.

In keeping with the dialectic of repression-oppression, meanwhile, we often find this laughter to be perversely self-directed. Chimpanzees, so similar to us, are typically depicted as idiotic versions of ourselves, and therefore attract special ridicule. With 98 percent of their DNA shared with us, with a strikingly similar physique and mannerisms but covered in fur, the chimpanzee is the *animal* double (the *doppelgänger*) of the human being. A double sado-masochistic humiliation is at play when a chimpanzee is made to don human clothing (a staple of satirical cartoons, TV, and movies for decades). Both the chimpanzee and her human counterpart are mocked—one for being not-quite-human, and the other for being almost-animal.

As Adams observes, wrong laughter is often specifically directed at both women and animals. The cover of a contemporary humor book (found by the present author in a U.S. bookstore) shows a real decapitated and de-feathered hen, propped up by a brick wall in an alleyway, posed to look like a prostitute,

holding a cigarette, and puffing smoke out of her hollow neck. The violated body of the dead hen is equated with the soon-to-be-violated body of an almost-dead prostitute. Both the dead hen and the dead pig function as absent referents for the rape of women—that is, both are “transmuted into a metaphor for someone else’s existence or fate.”<sup>57</sup> In *The Sexual Politics of Meat*, Adams discusses a picture of one “Ursula Hamdress” (after the Swiss actress Ursula Andress) which appeared in the satirical magazine *Playboar* in the early 1980s. In the photo, a dead pig sits spread-eagled on a chair wearing women’s panties, posed as though masturbating. Adams connects the sexualization of the dead pig to Gary Heidnik’s kidnapping, torture, and rape of six women a few years later. (Heidnik murdered two of his victims, dismembered them, and fed their body parts to his other captives.) Adams writes, “I hold that Ursula Hamdress and the women raped, butchered, and eaten under Heidnik’s directions are linked by an overlap of cultural images of sexual violence against women and the fragmentation and dismemberment of nature and the body in Western culture.”<sup>58</sup> As Adams has demonstrated throughout her work, images of violation and dismemberment of women and animals are often presented in a joking or mocking way. But such maniacal laughter scarcely conceals the despair and guilt beneath: despair, because we know that in brutalizing other animals we mutilate ourselves psychically, and guilt, because we secretly identify with these beings we have taught ourselves to hate.

The repressed animal can also return in a less brutal and distorted form, however. Akira Mizuta Lippit suggests that Freud saw dreams in part as a “regression” or a return to (or of) a lost animality. On the topic of wish fulfillment, Freud asked, “What do geese dream of? Of Maize.”<sup>59</sup> Not only does Freud’s question and answer confirm his view that other animals in fact dream, Lippit writes, but it also indicates his belief that in our own dreams we embrace our lost animality. “If, as Freud believes, the origins of dream wishes are revealed in regression, then the recourse to animality here suggests a point of contact between the deepest recesses of memory and the animal world.”<sup>60</sup> In other words, in dreams we restore the animality we otherwise subdue in the artificial, repressive, all-too-human world we have constructed over the millennia. Freud reduces the particular animals that appear in the dreams of his patients to *symbols* and metaphors (in other words, absent referents) for specifically human experiences.<sup>61</sup> But there is much more at stake, particularly in our *waking* dreams—our fantasy lives—concerning other animals than Freud conceded or perhaps comprehended.

Just as Freud posited the function of dreams to be the fulfillment of wishes, so too our fantasy lives—as played out in cultural media such as film, literature, ads, children’s stories, and so forth—express the partial fulfillment of a wish to restore our own animality to a prior—or, rather, as yet unachieved—

state. Just like the band of brothers who attempt to atone for their sin of patricide by resurrecting the murdered father in the idea of God, so we attempt to compensate for the murder of our fellow sentient beings in bucolic images in stories and animated films of happy, healthy farm animals grazing and sunbathing in lush fields, joyously bounding about, scratching, sniffing the earth, cuddling their human companions, and so on. These scenes reflect a repressed desire to reconstitute, to put back together, the bodies and lives of other animals whom we have so brutally mutilated.<sup>62</sup> Violent fantasies are in fact often accompanied or followed by restorative ones. Thus, as Klein suggests, "if the baby has, in his aggressive phantasies, injured his mother by biting and tearing her up, he may soon build up phantasies that he is putting the bits together again and repairing her."<sup>63</sup> Similarly, even as we dream up new ways to genetically engineer, hybridize, and disassemble other animals into so many parts for our consumption, we recreate them symbolically on screen and in other media, desiring to make them whole again. Such images assert the powerful claim of the erotic imagination against enlightenment rationality. As Adorno and Horkheimer observed of the "culture industry" of their own time, "[c]artoon and stunt films were once exponents of fantasy against rationalism. They allowed justice to be done to the animals and things electrified by their technology, by granting the mutilated beings a second life."<sup>64</sup>

Our veritable fixation on animal images is therefore an indication of our unacknowledged and ambivalent *attachment* to the repressed object.<sup>65</sup> We also look to animal images to be reassured that we have not irreversibly revoked our profound connection with other animals. In her analysis of the proliferation of animal images in cell phone advertisements and media culture, Jody Berland describes the promise of reconnection to other animals that is granted by such images and the products they are promoting: "[t]he pictures of animals promise a sense of attachment and security which might feel analogous to the 'natural' connection between animals and man, and which is waiting to be fulfilled the way a love-struck teenager waits for a phone call."<sup>66</sup> Ironically, cell phones and other digital communication technologies may in fact increase our distance from animality by, for example, turning our attention from the sounds of *real* birds chirping in the trees around us to the sounds of electronic "birds chirping" in the form of ring tones. Nonetheless, so hungry are we for a renewed connectivity with our abandoned animal kin that we eat up the telecommunications' companies false promises of "connection."

In reality, animal images have ceased to be restorative and instead, in Adorno and Horkheimer's view, "merely confirm the victory of technological rationality over truth."<sup>67</sup> Today, art and cultural media disguise the brutal reality of our domination of other beings with an imaginary counterpart without actually effecting any transformation. As Freud explains, art only superficially

reconciles the reality principle with the pleasure principle.<sup>68</sup> That is, in her work, the artist (or graphic designer, etc.) brings back to life the repressed pleasure principle without threatening the established order. But there is a deception involved inasmuch as the artist "shap[es] his fantasies into a new kind of reality, which are appreciated by people as valid representations of the real world."<sup>69</sup> When people look at the artist's work, they are momentarily convinced that the canvas depicting the fantasy world is really just a *mirror* of reality. The artist is able to deceive others into believing that he is somehow living proof of this other world "only because other people feel the same dissatisfaction he does at the renunciations imposed by reality."<sup>70</sup> But especially in the case of commercial or commodified cultural expression, such collective self-deception ultimately *perpetuates* this dissatisfaction. Adorno and Horkheimer emphasize how easily art can reinforce rather than challenge the status quo: "[a]s long as art does not insist on being treated as knowledge, and thus exclude itself from praxis, it is tolerated by social praxis in the same way as pleasure."<sup>71</sup> In other words, so long as art remains simply a representation of an unattainable ideal, and not the stuff of actual change, it reinforces or masks what *is*, at the expense of the pursuit of what *ought* to be. Indeed, as Berland further points out, there is a glaring disconnect between the image of human-animal harmony in mass culture and the reality of the devastating impact the production and disposal of cell phones have on the health and well-being of other species.<sup>72</sup> Restorative images, in other words, do not necessarily amount to restorative practices, but in fact can signal a general submission to the status quo.

## CONCLUSION

The repression of animality and the oppression of other animals which began in classical antiquity has caused profound psychic damage to human beings. With the rise of global capitalism and consumer culture and the intensification and normalization of brutal violence against other animals—both artificial consequences of the denial of our animality—we are arguably more alienated, more neurotic, and more psychically troubled than ever before. As Wilhelm Reich long ago pointed out, capitalism has de-animalized the human in part by imposing "a pattern of compulsory work" on the individual, whereby labor and activity are drained of any animal or erotic *pleasure*, to such an extreme degree that we effectively become the machines we use, only more terrifying for our (learned) sadism.<sup>73</sup> Because our animality lingers on in our embodied unconscious, however, there are limits to how far we can sustain such hysterical indifference, fragmentation, and self-alienation. Over-



coming the pathology of speciesism will therefore entail not merely social, ethical, and political action, but curative *psychic* action as well.

Other animals, it goes without saying, by far suffer the brunt of speciesism. Yet we humans damage ourselves psychically, too, in denying our fundamental identity with other animals and claiming a false superiority over them. A society which confines, mutilates, and kills billions of animals each year—the same animals whose beauty overwhelms us with awe, whose affection we universally long for, and whose pain and pleasure we feel so deeply—can be neither healthy nor sane. Nor can movements claiming to represent the oppressed be true to the spirit of universal social justice so long as their members remain willfully blind to the plight of billions of sentient creatures under capitalism. To fight for indigenous rights, for ecological protection, for women's liberation, or for the elimination of racism while writing off animal liberation as an obstacle to human liberation is to remain captive to narcissistic delusion. As Cary Wolfe observes, the repression of animality is not limited to traditional, hegemonic religio-philosophical thought, but is rampant in recent discourses of social justice as well. In his words, there is a “fundamental *repression* that underlies most ethical and political discourse: repressing the question of nonhuman subjectivity, taking it for granted that the subject is always already human.”<sup>74</sup> Those who imagine a universal freedom only in terms of *human* freedom, justice only as *human* social justice, in this way re-inscribe species privilege.<sup>75</sup> Repression of animality is therefore a major stumbling block in the development of truly liberatory discourses and practices, and to the well-being of all sentient beings, human and more-than-human.

Marcuse suggests a way out of this endless cycle of destructive fantasy and guilt in his analysis of the ancient Greek myths of Narcissus and Orpheus. Both myths center on humans' reunification with nature and animals and serve as examples of a new, non-neurotic, and non-repressive order. Marcuse offers Narcissus not as a symbol of solipsistic self-interest—Freud's characterization of the first few years of infancy—but rather of our potential for harmonious *relationality* and *identity* with humans and other animals. When Narcissus gazes with love at his own image in the water, he is enraptured not only with himself, but also with the other: nature or the more-than-human. In short, he does not project himself onto nature or impose a singular meaning upon the latter (as European humans did with the transition to enlightenment) but rather sees himself as a part of, and as constituted by, nature:

The love of Narcissus is answered by the echo of nature. . . . His silence is not that of dead rigidity; and when he is contemptuous of the hunters and nymphs he rejects one Eros for another. He lives by an Eros of his own, and he does not only love himself. He does not know that the image he admires is his own.<sup>76</sup>

If Narcissus can be seen as the symbol of the triumph of Eros over modern humanity's hatred of itself as a natural being, as an *animal*, Orpheus represents our potential reconciliation with both ourselves and other animals. As Marcuse writes, “the song of Orpheus pacifies the animal world, reconciles the lion with the lamb and the lion with man.”<sup>77</sup> This image brings back to life not only the animals mutilated at our hands, but our sense of kinship with them. The Orphic myth thus inspires us to overcome the repression-oppression complex and the pathology of speciesism by demonstrating that no liberation will be universal or complete so long as it leaves the other animals behind. Of course, to overcome repression and to cure modern human beings of their pathological hatred of and ambivalence toward animals will require much more than recourse to myths. Collective remembrance of what we have lost, and of our sorrow over that loss, must be transformed into *praxis*: “Remembrance is no real weapon unless it is translated into historical action.”<sup>78</sup> Among other things, a feminist ethics of care, which recognizes overlapping oppressions and which is “grounded in an emotional and spiritual conversation with nonhuman life-forms” and in “women's relational culture of caring and attentive love,” would be central to such a praxis—a way to begin reversing the impact of a repression-oppression complex that is literally suicidal, zoocidal, and ecocidal.<sup>79</sup> If we wish to see and think clearly, and act justly, we must embrace a praxis which eliminates the rational human/irrational animal binary opposition and restores our repressed animality to its fullest expression. Only then might we take up our proper position amongst the other beings-in-the-world.

27. Ibid., 182.
28. Ibid., 187.
29. Blaise Pascal, *The Provincial Letters*, as quoted in *Philosophy of Right*, 171 (italics added).
30. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 433 (note by Allen Wood to page 180).
31. Ibid., 184.
32. Ibid., 182.
33. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 6.
34. Derrida, *Animal I Am*, 20.
35. Ibid., 25.
36. Ibid., 29.
37. Cf. Charles Patterson, *Eternal Treblinka* (New York: Lantern Books, 2002).
38. Derrida, *Animal I Am*, 26.
39. I mean "pathetic" here in the neutral, literal sense of the word, as "arousing sadness, compassion, or sympathy, esp. through vulnerability or sadness; pitiable" (Oxford English Dictionary.) It is telling that the colloquial use of the word now incites feelings of scorn or blame. Hatred of the weak and helpless is characteristic of what Adorno and Horkheimer classify as the "authoritarian personality." The modern, authoritarian subject hates all signs of weakness and vulnerability. He mocks and degrades the victim, not content with its defeat, because he is complicit in a society that has made a victim of everyone, including himself. In the end, weakness itself is enough of a provocation for violence. The numerous undercover videos of slaughterhouse workers torturing and humiliating animals, mocking the squealing of pigs and groaning of cows, demonstrates a need to lash out at those who are pathetic. What the men who slam pigs into concrete floors and tear the wings off of live chickens don't realize is that they are provoked by the distorted reflection, in the terrified faces and cowering demeanors of their victims, of their own defeated lives. Cf. "Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment" in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.
40. Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Volume XVII* (London: Hogarth Press Ltd., 1962), 139.
41. Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 212.
42. Freud, *Volume XVII*, 140.
43. Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life* (New York: Verso, 2005), 247.
44. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 210.
45. According to Primo Levi, "there was no general rule [for survival], except entering the camp in good health and knowing German. Barring this, luck dominated. I have seen the survival of shrewd people and silly people, the brave and the cowardly, 'thinkers' and madmen." (*Survival in Auschwitz*, 180.)
46. In the United States the obvious comparison is between "farm animals" and cats and dogs, but there are far more telling cases. The rabbit is perhaps the best exemplar of our arbitrary oscillation between violence and care. She may be a loved pet, an expensive bourgeois meal, a pair of mittens, or a pair of eyes to be tortured with beauty products, depending on the context.

47. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2007) 22 (italics added).
48. Ibid., 21.
49. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 140.

## CHAPTER 9

1. Rainer Maria Rilke, "Sonnets to Orpheus" (n. XIII), in *In Praise of Morality: Selections from Rainer Maria Rilke's Duino Elegies and Sonnets to Orpheus*, trans. and ed. Anita Barrows and Joanna Macy (London and New York: Riverhead Books, 2005), 119.
2. Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation*, new rev. ed. (New York: Avon Books, 1990), 6.
3. I have borrowed this conception of embodied consciousness from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who suggests that while every animal, human or otherwise, has its own "style of being," all embodied beings navigate the world and their experience "through [their] bodies." Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception* (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2004), 53f.
4. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr and Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 2.
5. Ibid., 3.
6. Ibid., 2.
7. Ibid., 204.
8. Ibid., 28.
9. Ibid., 204. Freud also acknowledges the profound shifts in our relationship with other animals from animism and totemic traditions to the Greek period and points, if only in passing, to the profound psychic distress that has resulted. He points out, for example, that "in the Athenian festival of Buphonia, a formal trial was introduced after the sacrifice in which everyone taking part was interrogated," even though the deed was committed under the auspices of a fully sanctioned sacrifice. Moreover, Freud points to "a certain psychical alienation from the animal" which occurred when animistic totemic traditions submitted to the "disruption" of their practices of animal worship with the introduction of domestication. See Sigmund Freud, "Totem and Taboo: Some Correspondences between the Psychical Lives of Savages and Neurotics," in *On Murder, Mourning, and Melancholia*, trans. Shaun Whiteside (London: Penguin Classics, 2005), 137, 147.
10. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 132f.
11. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 109.
12. Horkheimer and Adorno, xiv.
13. Ibid., 211.
14. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 158.
15. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 87.
16. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 52.

17. Freud, *The Unconscious*, trans. Graham Frankland (London: Penguin Classics, 2005), 36.
18. Christopher T. White, "The Modern Magnetic Animal: *As I Lay Dying* and the Uncanny Zoology of Modernism," *Journal of Modern Literature*, vol. 31, no. 3 (Spring 2008), 90.
19. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," in *On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia*, 207.
20. Freud, *The Unconscious*, 25. (Freud's italics.)
21. Freud, "Totem and Taboo," 140–44.
22. *Ibid.*, 151f.
23. Freud's account of the "phylogenetic" origins of repressive civilization in the patricide of the so-called "primal horde" is largely discredited, and rightly so—not least because of its racist presuppositions and its lack of historical and anthropological verifiability, and because of its reduction of diverse cultural traditions to pathology. Similarly, the anthropocentrism inherent in Freud's claim that the sacred totemic animal represents the murdered father seriously undermines the validity of this explanation. Notwithstanding these objections to Freud's theory of ambivalence in both his phylogenetic and "ontogenetic" theories of development, it appears the same neurosis is at play in our dealings with other animals. For an example of the rejection of Freud's theory of the "archaic heritage" of the primal horde, see Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 59.
24. Melanie Klein, "Love, Guilt and Reparation," in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works (1921–1945)* (New York: Delacorte Press/Seymour Lawrence, 1975), 311.
25. Freud, *The Unconscious*, 43.
26. Odysseus had to have himself tied to the ship's mast in order to avoid succumbing to the lure of the Sirens' song, and to assert himself as the great man of reason and cunning, nature's mighty conqueror. See Adorno and Horkheimer, 25. It is no wonder that slaughterhouses have among the highest worker turnover rates in the United States.
27. Carol Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory* (New York: Continuum, 2006), 53.
28. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Classics, 1990), 481f.
29. Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), xvi, xxi.
30. Horkheimer and Adorno, 207.
31. Josephine Donovan, "Animal Rights and Feminist Theory," in *The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics: A Reader*, ed. Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 65.
32. Sigmund Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, trans. and rev. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 23.
33. On how feeling is reduced to sentimentality in the context of human-animal relations, see Josephine Donovan, "Animal Rights and Feminist Theory," 59.
34. Freud, "The Uncanny," in *The Uncanny*, trans. David McLintock (London and New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 131.
35. *Ibid.*, 132, 126.
36. *Ibid.*, 134.

37. *Ibid.*, 132.
38. Christopher T. White, "The Modern Magnetic Animal: *As I Lay Dying* and the Uncanny Zoology of Modernism," in *Journal of Modern Literature*, vol. 31, no. 3 (Spring 2008), 85.
39. White, 86.
40. Horkheimer and Adorno, 11.
41. See note 3.
42. According to Heidegger, "[p]lant and animal are suspended in something outside of themselves without ever being able to 'see' either the outside or the inside, i.e., to have it stand as an aspect unconcealed in the free of Being." Although Heidegger does distinguish between stones, machines, and other animals, he still denies the latter access to "the open": "[a]nd never would it be possible for a stone, no more than for an airplane, to elevate itself toward the sun in jubilation and to move like a lark, which nevertheless does not see the open." Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 160. In his analysis of this and other passages in *Parmenides*, Giorgio Agamben also notes contradictions in Heidegger's thought and argues that in fact for Heidegger "the animal is at once open and not open." As a way out of this metaphysical bind, Agamben posits that we "let [the animal] be *outside of being*," and abandon the question of Being altogether. Giorgio Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal*, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 59, 91f.
43. Rainer Maria Rilke, "The Eighth Elegy," in *In Praise of Morality*, 49.
44. Fromm, *The Sane Society* (New York and Toronto: Rinehart & Company, 1955), 23f.
45. Freud, "The Uncanny," 141f.
46. Theodore Roethke, "The Bat," *Words for the Wind: The Collected Verse of Theodore Roethke* (Bloomington, IN, 1968), p. 25.
47. Merleau-Ponty, 54.
48. See Emmanuel Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2003), 86.
49. Freud, *The Unconscious*, 44.
50. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," in *On Murder, Mourning, and Melancholia*, 209.
51. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 79.
52. Freud, *The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious*, trans. Joyce Crick (London: Penguin Classics, 2002), 107.
53. Freud, *The Unconscious*, 39.
54. Adorno and Horkheimer, 88. For further discussion of "wrong laughter" and animal oppression, see Zipporah Weisberg, "The Broken Promises of Monsters: Haraway, Animals, and the Humanist Legacy," *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2009), [www.criticalanimalstudies.org/?page\\_id=396](http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/?page_id=396).
55. Adorno and Horkheimer, 112.
56. *Ibid.*, 112.
57. Adams, 42.
58. *Ibid.*, 40.

59. Akira Mizuta Lippit, "Magnetic Animal: Derrida, Wildlife, *Animetaphor*," in *MLN: Modern Language Notes*, vol. 113, no. 5, *Comparative Literature Issue* (December 1998), 1111.

60. *Ibid.*, 1112.

61. For example, Freud tells us that dreams of lizards whose tails fall off are supposed to symbolize "the warding-off of castration" and mentions that "[m]any of the beasts which are used as genital symbols in mythology and folklore play the same part in dreams: e.g., fishes, snails, cats, mice (on account of the pubic hair), and above all those most important symbols of the male organ—snakes. Small animals and vermin represent small children." See Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), 474.

62. Horkheimer and Adorno, 27.

63. Klein, 308.

64. Adorno and Horkheimer, 110.

65. Fixation is defined as "a particularly intimate attachment of a drive to an object." Freud, *The Unconscious*, 37.

66. Jody Berland, "Animal and/as Medium: Symbolic Work in Communicative Regimes," *The Global South*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 2009), [http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/journals/the\\_global\\_south/v003/3.1.berland.html](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/journals/the_global_south/v003/3.1.berland.html).

67. Adorno and Horkheimer, 110.

68. Freud, *The Unconscious*, 7.

69. *Ibid.*, 7.

70. *Ibid.*, 7.

71. Horkheimer and Adorno, 25.

72. Berland, "Animal and/as Medium," 59.

73. Wilhelm Reich, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, trans. Vincent R. Carfagno (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1971), 335f.

74. Cary Wolfe, *Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Post-humanist Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 1. (My italics.)

75. *Ibid.*, 7.

76. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 166f.

77. *Ibid.*, 166.

78. *Ibid.*, 233.

79. Donovan, 76.

## CHAPTER 10

1. *Guidelines for the Care and Use of Mammals in Neuroscience and Behavioral Research* (National Research Council of the National Academies, National Academies Press, 2003), 91.

2. *Ibid.*, 77.

3. *Ibid.*, 92.

4. Matthew 27:33.

5. Eliot Katz, DVM, letter to NIH. [www.vivisectioninfo.org/ucsf/nihresponse.html](http://www.vivisectioninfo.org/ucsf/nihresponse.html)

6. Matthew 27:46.

7. Guidelines, 78.

8. Mark 15:37.

9. Hamlet I, v.

10. *Ibid.*, v.

11. *Ibid.*, ii.

12. *Ibid.*, iv.

13. An academic correspondent, e-mail, March 30, 2006.

14. Genesis 22:17.

15. W. F. Sternberg, L. Scorr, L. D. Smith, C. G. Ridgway, M. Stout, "Long-Term Effects of Neonatal Surgery on Adulthood Pain Behavior," *Pain*, vol. 113 (2005), 347–53. Also W. F. Sternberg, C. Ridgway, M. Stout, H. Takahashi, J. Steinemann, "Untreated Pain on Day of Birth Permanently Alters Pain Sensitivity in Mice," *Society for Neuroscience Abstracts*, vol. 28 (2002).

16. Job 30:29.

17. Correspondent, op. cit., e-mail, April 7, 2006.

18. Hamlet I, ii.

19. Macbeth, I, v.

20. *Ibid.*, V, i.

21. Marlowe, *Doctor Faustus*, XIV.

22. Macbeth IV, i.

23. *Doctor Faustus*, XIV.

## CHAPTER 11

1. Donald D. Kyle, *Sports and Spectacle in the Ancient World* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishers, 2007).

2. De Las Casas cited in Charles Patterson, *Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust* (New York: Lantern Books, 2004), 32.

3. Marjorie Spiegel, *The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery*, 3rd rev. ed. (New York: Mirror Books, 1997).

4. Patterson.

5. The Nazis also murdered Roma (gypsies), homosexuals, and Marxists among others groups. This paper is about the processes through which the Nazis animalized the Jews, which is not meant to minimize the atrocities committed against these other groups.

6. Kenneth Burke, "The Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle," in Joseph R. Gusfield, ed., *Kenneth Burke: On Symbols and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

7. Felicity Rash, *The Language of Violence: Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf* (New York: Lang Publishers, 2006).

8. Patterson.

9. Adolph Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Boston: Mariner Book/Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996). See especially ch. 11, "Nation and Race."